What’s happening?
The volume of the voice of shareholders and others on the topic of executive remuneration has been turned up considerably in the last 12 months. Following particular focus in the United States and the United Kingdom on remuneration for executives in the financial services industry, the Australian government has referred this matter to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) for consideration.
The aim of the APRA review is to ensure that remuneration is structured to promote long-term sustainability and avoid perverse incentives. This is despite the fact that in Australia executive remuneration and industry collapses and misadventures have not been as extreme as elsewhere, and the Australian financial system has come through the global economic meltdown in relatively good shape, so far.
While APRA is unlikely to dictate prescriptive limits and requirements, executive remuneration will be subject to more direct scrutiny and comment for the balance of this year at least in Australia, and not just in financial services or at the CEO and group executive levels. Further, the scrutiny will not be just by shareholders, but also by regulators, unions, lenders and employees.
In this article we discuss:
- concerns that have been raised regarding executive remuneration
- existing protections in respect of executive remuneration
- suggestions that have been made to address these concerns, and
- some of the implications for business of these suggestions.
Concerns about executive remuneration
Many concerns have been expressed about aspects of executive remuneration including:
- the independence of the board of directors or remuneration committee from executives, especially the CEO
- the quantum of base pay, annual bonus and long term incentives compared to average earnings and historical executive remuneration levels
- a perceived lack of transparency between remuneration and performance, due, for example, to complexity or confidentiality
- the short-term focus and/or excessive risk taking induced by some performance hurdles
- the ability for measures of performance to be manipulated, and
- termination benefits provided in circumstances of individual or company underperformance.
Existing protections for shareholders and others
In Australia, corporations legislation, the listing rules of the Australian Securities Exchange and the general law already provide protections and disclosure for shareholders and other stakeholders regarding executive remuneration. These include:
- obligations on directors to act in the best interests of the company
- the prevalence of board remuneration committees (in order to meet their obligations in the context of executive remuneration, boards frequently take external advice regarding the reasonableness of remuneration, together with financial and legal advice)
- the presence of independent directors on boards
- requirements for shareholder approval of some termination payments and the provision of benefits to related parties
- restrictions on the provision of ‘change of control’ benefits
- restrictions on the issue of securities and certain termination payments
- specific disclosure requirements for CEO employment arrangements and general disclosure requirements in respect of remuneration including the requirement for an annual ‘remuneration report’ setting out general policy regarding remuneration and how this is linked to performance, as well as specific information regarding remuneration provided to certain executives, and
- the non-binding vote by shareholders on the remuneration report, or ‘say on pay’.
Suggestions for addressing concerns
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) has suggested the following measures to deal with some of the concerns that have been raised regarding executive remuneration:
- binding ‘say on pay’ for executive remuneration
- shareholder approval of senior executive employment arrangements and termination benefits, and
- disclosure by government and institutional shareholders of their voting policy and position on the issue.
Unions may also use the information provision requirements in the new ‘good faith bargaining’ obligations (to commence from 1 July 2009) to seek further disclosure of manager and executive remuneration, thus potentially putting pressure on organisations in this area to take a ‘front page’ approach. That is, unless you would be comfortable for the arrangements to be on the front page of a national daily newspaper, they should not be implemented.
The Australian Council of Super Investors has suggested a requirement for more explanation and transparency of the links between pay and performance.
Other suggestions from various stakeholders include:
- a right of ‘clawback’ of termination and other payments in certain circumstances, such as where future earnings or performance are not achieved
- changes to the tax treatment for employers of executive remuneration above $1 million, and
- limits on termination payments to executives.
In the United States, as a condition of the government-funded assistance programs for financial services industry participants, President Obama has capped executive remuneration and prohibited vesting of long-term equity incentives while debt is owed under the ‘bail out’ package.
Implications for employers
Boards and senior management grapple already with the need to attract the best people to their organisations in the context of an international market for talent. It is said that further regulation in the area of executive pay will make this balancing act more difficult and may lead to underperformance, especially in financial services, because the ‘best people’ will seek employment where additional limits on remuneration do not apply.
The costs for business of having to comply with further regulation in this area must also be considered in circumstances where frequently employers are already required to engage external financial, remuneration and legal advisers for the purposes of setting and implementing executive remuneration arrangements. These costs may be increased, in particular, if restrictions and procedural requirements are implemented in respect of a broader class of executives, that is, not just directors and the most senior executives. Further, costs may vary considerably depending on whether an employer is in the financial services industry or not if further regulation is limited in its application to this sector.
Other practical issues arising from some of the suggestions to address the concerns regarding executive remuneration include:
- executive consent will usually be required before employers can change existing remuneration arrangements with executives, because such change will amount to a variation of their employment contract
- the ability of employers to ‘claw back’ payments made or benefits provided after the employment relationship has ended, and where unencumbered title has previously been provided to assets or funds, will be limited, and
- where executives are dissatisfied with their remuneration, or other aspects of their employment (for example, if a discretionary annual cash bonus is not at the level expected), there are several avenues that may potentially be available to them to seek compensation or damages from their employer, pursuant to the implied duties of good faith and trust and confidence in employment contracts or under the misleading and deceptive conduct provisions of trade practices legislation.
Depending on the approach of individual company boards and regulators, employers should be mindful of potential compulsory or advisory changes to executive employment arrangements and how this will affect their ability to attract and retain talent at the executive level.
In a future edition of Employee Relations Review, we will take a closer look at the initiatives that are being introduced around the world in respect of executive remuneration in the financial services industry.
This article was written by Justine Turnbull, Partner, of the Employee Relations team in Sydney.